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Abstract 
Loss of a parent is one of the most traumatic events a child can face.  If loss of a parent reduces 
investments in children, it can also have long-lasting implications.  This study uses parametric 
and semi-nonparametric matching techniques to estimate how one human capital investment, 
school enrollment, is affected by a parent’s recent death. We analyze data from 600,000 
households from Indonesia￿s National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) during 1994-96.  We 
find a parent’s recent death has a large effect on a child’s enrollment.  We also use this shock to 
test several theories of intra-household allocation and find little differential treatment based on 
the gender of the child or the deceased parent. 
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Loss of a parent while one is still young is likely to be the most traumatic event in a child￿s life.  If loss of 
a parent reduces investments in children￿s human capital, it can also have long-lasting implications on 
their quality of life and livelihood.  A significant proportion of school-aged children in less industrialized 
nations have always lost parents to accidents, childbirth, and illness.  Unfortunately, the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS has greatly increased death rates of young adults in much of the world and, thus, increased the 
importance of understanding how parental loss affects investments in children.  For example, one in ten 
African children under the age of 15 has lost one or both parents (Hunter and Williamson, 2000).  In this 
paper we study how loss of a parent affects children￿s school enrollment in Indonesia.  
  The international community has become increasingly concerned about the effect of adult 
mortality on children￿s schooling (Copson, 2002; World Bank, 1999).  Many programs, especially in 
Africa, have been launched or proposed to support the school fees, uniforms and other schooling-related 
costs of orphaned children (Hunter and Williamson, 2000; Reid, 1993).  However, the empirical evidence 
to support these policies is weak.  Lloyd and Blanc (1996) use population surveys with limited socio-
economic controls from 7 African countries and find mixed results. Ainsworth et al. (2000) analyze a 
well-designed panel survey of 757 households from Northwestern Tanzania and find that adult mortality 
delays school entry, but otherwise does not affect enrollment.  Indeed, there are conditions under which 
theoretical models predict no effect of parental death on enrollment (Becker and Tomes, 1979) 
One of the difficulties in studying the effects of parental mortality on children￿s schooling is 
finding data sets large enough to capture sufficient cases of prime-age adult mortality linked to the socio-
economic status of the household. We analyze data from Indonesia￿s National Socio-Economic Survey, 
known by its Indonesian acronym Susenas.  The Susenas is an annually repeated cross section of 
approximately 200,000 households.  We examine three years of Susenas surveys, from 1994 to 1996, and 
therefore have a sample of over six hundred thousand households.   Susenas collects information on the 
general welfare of each household member, including school enrollment and mortality in the 12 months 
prior to the survey.  Our bereaved sample (3,119 observations) includes individuals age 6 through 20, 
who live in households where either their mother or father died within the year prior to the survey. 3 
Like other research on the effects of family composition and income changes, this study carefully 
treats the problem of endogeneity; specifically, families that lose a parent were often disadvantaged 
before the loss of the parent.  In addition to a standard parametric technique (conditional logit with a fixed 
effect for each community), our large sample allows us to address the problems of nonrandom selection 
with a semi-nonparametric technique that matches youth who lose a parent to similar ￿control￿ youth who 
have similar observable characteristics and live in the same neighborhood.  
We find a parent’s recent death has a large effect on a child’s enrollment.  A child whose parent 
has recently died is on average 2.0 times more likely to drop out than children with living parents.  This 
effect is highest for youth at the transitions between primary and junior secondary and between junior 
secondary and senior secondary.  We also use this shock to test several theories of intra-household 
allocation and find little differential treatment based on the gender of the child or the deceased parent. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical literature on intergenerational altruism, mutual insurance, and intra-household allocation 
describes a number of pathways by which the loss of a parent might reduce the family￿s subsequent 
investments in a surviving child￿s human capital.  For example, loss of a parent decreases financial 
resources and parental involvement ￿ two key inputs into education.  In addition, household preferences 
for the quality of children may change.  There may also be psychological costs associated with a recent 
death.  Finally, the value of a child￿s time when at home may change.  
In the empirical work, however, we will not be able to identify the specific pathways. Rather, the 
focus of the empirical work is to estimate the cumulative effect on children￿s schooling via all pathways. 
For this reason, we do not put forward a formal theoretical model, but rather summarize the main 
theoretical arguments in the literature by which the loss of a parent might reduce investments in children. 
We organize the discussion by first presenting a ￿straw man￿ model in which the death of a 
parent does not affect a family￿s investment in their children. This model, first presented in Becker and 4 
Tomes (1979), has a number of strong assumptions. We then relax each of these assumptions to help us 
understand when the loss of a parent might reduce enrollments.  We then discuss the conditions under 
which daughters might be affected less than sons and when the loss of a mother might matter more than 
the loss of a father.  We end the section with a review of the existing empirical literature that indirectly 
supports the theory. 
The straw man  
In a seminal paper, Becker and Tomes (1979) developed a model of investments in children￿s 
human capital motivated by intergenerational altruism. In their model, they assume that (1) there are 
perfect capital markets so that parents are not liquidity constrained and can borrow against their children￿s 
future earnings, (2) schooling is valued solely for its contributions to future income, (3) neither 
investments of parental time nor the process of bereavement affect the value of schooling, (4) the 
opportunity cost of children￿s time is not affected by the death of a parent, and (5) parents care equally 
about each child and pay for education solely based on education￿s effects on future productivity (i.e., not 
based on ascribed characteristics such as sex).   
They derive the familiar result that a family￿s optimal investment is that which equates the 
marginal returns to education to the marginal costs.  Under the strong assumptions noted above, when 
parents can freely borrow against the future earnings of their children, investments in children are 
unaffected by shocks to a family￿s current income such as loss of a parent.  Intuitively, parents undertake 
investments with positive present values, and current income does not affect the payoff from the 
investment.   
Liquidity constraints and insurance 
In a follow-up paper, Becker and Tomes (1986) revisit the question of parental investments in 
children in the presence of imperfect capital markets such that families cannot borrow against future 
higher earnings that educated children will receive.  In this case, investments in children remain 5 
unaffected after a negative income shock for families with sufficient assets (i.e., precautionary savings), 
but investment declines for families with liquidity constraints.  
However, liquidity constraints may not be a problem if families are able to insure for unexpected 
parental death. In many industrialized nations, parents purchase life insurance to help smooth the living 
standard of and investments in their children if a parent dies.  While this mechanism is not widely used in 
Indonesia, informal insurance from neighbors and the extended family can be important factors in 
maintaining investments in children (Townsend, 1995).  
The ethnographic literature on Indonesia suggests that informal insurance within neighborhoods 
was often quite important after a family received a negative shock (e.g., Sullivan, 1994).  For example, 
the traditional Javanese funeral traditionally involves monetary gifts to the family of the deceased.  
Moreover, meals, childcare, and other resources are often provided by long-time neighbors to help 
maintain children￿s well-being.  Well-working informal insurance markets also provide a rationale for 
stable enrollment after loss of a parent in the presence of imperfect capital markets. 
At the same time, in both formal models of insurance and in the ethnographies of Indonesia, less 
positive outcomes are possible.  Mutual insurance is easiest to maintain when there is the potential for 
reciprocity; that is, if you are able to help out the person who helped you in your bad times when they 
have bad times. A permanent shock such as the death of a prime-age parent makes such reciprocity less 
likely to occur.  Thus, when insurance is maintained by expected future reciprocity, it will not work well 
for large shocks (Townsend, 1994; Sullivan, 1994), which suggests that enrollment might decline. 
Preferences and production 
Relaxing the other strong assumptions about preference and the education production function 
provides three additional pathways by which parental death can adversely affect children even when a 
family has no borrowing constraints or when they have access to well-working insurance mechanisms.  
First, when education is partly a parental consumption good (not just investment), enrollments 
may decline after a family￿s income declines.  6 
Second, if parental time is an argument of the education production function, there is likely to be 
less investment in schooling.  When a parent dies there is less total time available to spend working and in 
household production activities including helping children with homework or transporting them to school.  
If schooling is more productive when parental involvement is high and the surviving parent spends less 
time helping children with their schooling than two parents would have, the marginal benefits of a child￿s 
education falls.  Thus, if parental time is an input into education, loss of a parent might reduce 
enrollments even when parents can borrow against children￿s future earnings.  
Conversely, if parental time is a substitute for schooling, schooling may rise after the loss of a 
parent.  For example, schools may provide childcare for children who would otherwise need adult 
supervision if they remained at home. This effect is mostly likely to hold for children who need the most 
parental supervision such as those in the early primary grades. 
Finally, loss of a parent is tremendously traumatic, and it may affect the bereaved child￿s 
emotional status and values. The trauma of bereavement may make it difficult for children to study and 
children may temporarily or permanently withdraw from school.  Similarly, a parent who dies when a 
child is young may not have been able to pass on norms and values.  Indeed, many children remain in 
school because of their family values.  When a parent disappears from the household, children may no 
longer have the motivation to continue their education. 
Sons versus daughters 
The discussion so far has focused on the conditions under which the death of a parent would 
reduce the amount invested in children￿s education.  However, the effect may not be uniform within the 
household.  Indeed, Alderman and Gertler (1997) posit several conditions under which daughters tend to 
bear a disproportionate share of bad shocks.
2  The effect of parental death would be smaller on sons than 
on daughters if sons traditionally care for parents in old age or if sons have a higher return to education.  
                                                           
2 The hypothesis of daughters being more at risk has been found in a number of studies. For example, investments in 
sons are more likely to be protected during famines (Dreze and Sen, 1989) and after bad harvests (Rose, 1999; 
Cameron and Worsick, 2001) than are investments in daughters. 7 
Moreover, parents may have preferences for higher education for their sons; often these preferences are 
related to widely held norms of gender roles.  For example, a survey of village experts in traditional law 
in Indonesia found that roughly half of villages had traditions of giving sons preference in education over 
daughters.  As the male-female gap in Indonesia has declined in recent decades, so has this tradition; only 
one seventh of village heads suggested that 1997 practices were still unequal (Kevane and Levine, 2002).  
Under plausible conditions, when parents prefer sons on average, parents will invest marginal resources in 
daughters; correspondingly, daughters will lose more when living standards decline.  
When parents find their time stretched, the value of children￿s time outside of school may 
increase.  Most importantly, the ethnographic literature on Indonesia stresses the important role that oldest 
daughters often play in caring for younger siblings.  When a parent dies, the remaining parent is 
particularly likely to find this assistance useful.  In the framework of Becker and Tomes￿ theory, a higher 
opportunity cost of time reduces enrollments.   
If parents try to protect sons, then children (both male and female) with many brothers will be at 
particularly high risk (Garg and Morduch, 1998).  Intuitively, in cultures where sons are very important, 
an only son is privileged, while a sister with many brothers, or a brother with many brothers, is less likely 
to receive extra protection. If this between-sibling competition is important, then enrollment rates among 
families that lose a parent may decline more if the proportion of brothers is high (controlling for family 
size).   
Loss of father vs. mother 
The loss of a father might have a greater impact than the loss of a mother if men have higher 
earnings power. In Indonesia, men in the wage-earning sector earn substantially more than do women of 
similar observable qualifications.
3  Moreover, men are more likely to work in the relatively well-paid 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
3 Source: 1996 Sakernas.  A median regression shows women earn 39 percent lower wages than men of similar age 
and education.  (To be precise, the estimate was 0.39 lower log(wages) for women.) 8 
formal sector than are women.
4  If liquidity constraints are the main constraints on children￿s education, 
these labor market inequalities imply that loss of a father should affect education more than loss of a 
mother.  
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that the loss of a mother may be more important 
than the loss of a father. Moreover, a number of models of intra-household bargaining imply that 
household decisions such as investments in children are complex averages of each parental (and perhaps 
child) preferences. In these models, a household member￿s preferences affect resource allocation in 
proportion to her contribution to household resources.
5  There is evidence from other developing countries 
that mothers tend to invest more of the income they control in children than do fathers (Haddad and 
Hoddinott, 1994; Thomas, 1997).  Thus, the loss of the mother may not only adversely affect investment 
in children through an income effect, but also through a substitution effect away from investments in 
children due to an increasing importance of the preferences of the father.  Similarly, if mothers favor 
daughters relatively more than fathers, then the loss of a mother will affect daughters even more than the 
loss of a father. 
There are two other Indonesia-specific reasons why the loss of mother might be more important. 
First, Indonesian mothers do the bulk of childrearing work.  These tasks may be important complements 
to education; for example, consider the time it takes to help a child get dressed, fed, and transported to 
school.  Also, in many parts of Indonesia, social support networks are based on the mother, not the father 
(Geertz, 1963; Manderson, 1983).   
These inequalities in traditional time-use patterns, preferences and social support imply that, 
holding all else constant, loss of a mother should affect education more than loss of a father. The relative 
importance of maternal loss should be highest for elementary school children, when the time it takes to 
help a child attend school is highest.  These predictions are supported by Ainsworth, et al. (2000), which 
measures the impact of adult mortality on enrollment in Northwestern Tanzania.  
                                                           
4 Source: Susenas 
5 For an introduction to the many theories of intrahousehold allocation, see the models in Haddad et al. (1997).   9 
Evidence  
There is some indirect empirical evidence to support the prediction that children￿s outcomes, 
including educational achievement, are adversely affected by a parent￿s death.  A number of studies 
report positive correlation of child outcomes with family resources, such as income, education, assets and 
time. Research in the United States has found that parental income has an important positive effect on 
educational attainment. (Hill and Duncan, 1987 and Haveman and Wolfe, 1995 review this literature; 
contra see Mayer, 1997), and that achievement in school is positively linked to parental investments of 
time (Datcher-Loury, 1988; Steelman and Mercy, 1980; Leibowitz, 1974).   
  The effect of parental absence on children’s educational outcomes through divorce (a less severe 
shock than death of a parent) has also been well documented. A number of studies provide evidence that 
children in single-parent families have lower grades, poorer school attendance, higher dropout rates and 
more problems with school authorities (Astone and McLanahan, 1991; Downey, 1994; Hetherington et 
al., 1983; Krein and Beller, 1988; McLanahan, 1985; Pong, 1997).  However, school achievement and 
family structure may be jointly determined by unobservable family characteristics (Levine and Painter, 
2000).   
    
The Context 
With a population just over 200 million, Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world.  From 
1980 until the economic crisis of 1997, Indonesia experienced very rapid economic growth of over 6% 
per year.  Despite the country’s rapid increase in wealth, the average Indonesian remained quite poor. 
Even before the 1997 financial crisis, almost 10 percent of Indonesians lived beneath the poverty line of 
about $1 per day. 
Indonesia has made substantial improvements in education over the last 20 years.  Due partly to 
school expansion efforts and a compulsory education law passed in 1984, primary enrollment increased 10 
from 79 to 95 percent from 1983 to 1999.
6  While the average 50-year old in Indonesia in 1999 had 5.1 
years of schooling, the average 20-year-old had 8.7 years.  Nevertheless, compared to other nations in the 
region and to other nations with similar income per capita, Indonesia had higher infant mortality, lower 
life expectancy and more child malnutrition even before the financial crisis. 
Unlike many Asian nations, educational achievement of boys and girls is close to parity through 
secondary school.  In 1999, girls had slightly higher primary school enrollment than boys (95.6 vs. 
94.9%, ages 7-12), while boys had slightly higher early secondary school enrollment (79.3 vs. 78.7%, 
ages 13-15). This enrollment gap widens only a small amount in late secondary school, with boys at 
51.5% and girls at 50.8% (ages 16-18). 
Despite the facts that education in Indonesia is inexpensive and widely accessible, many families 
choose not to keep their children in school.  Common motives for not enrolling children include 
(especially for poor families) the cost of uniforms and supplies, difficulties commuting in some areas, and 
the usefulness of child and youth labor at home, on the family farm, or in employment.  This paper 
examines the effect of a large financial shock, the death of a parent, on children￿s subsequent enrollment.  
Indonesia is an important place to examine the effects of adult mortality on children because, as 
in many developing countries, access to formal insurance mechanisms is poor.  Only 1.8% of households 
in 1999 paid for any kind of insurance.  Furthermore, almost half of Indonesian workers were self-
employed in 1999, and few companies offer death benefits.  With weak formal insurance systems and low 
initial income and assets in most families, many Indonesian children are at risk of harm after a decline in 
family resources. 
In spite of the weak formal institutions, several informal institutions may reduce harm to children 
after the loss of a parent.
7  Most directly useful in the short run is the tradition (at least on Java, where 
roughly half of Indonesians live) that neighbors and family members who attend a funeral contribute cash 
and food to the survivors.  In the longer term, the Muslim tradition of giving alms to widows and their 
                                                           
6 Government of Indonesia, 1996.  1999 figure from Susenas, described below. 11 
children at least once a year can be helpful in communities where that tradition functions well. Also 
important in the longer term is the common custom of fostering out children to relatives in hard times.  
 
Data Sources and Analysis Sample 
We analyze data from Susenas surveys, from 1994 to 1996, and have a sample of over six hundred 
thousand households.  Susenas surveys the head of the household on the general welfare of each 
household member in areas such as school enrollment, health, and mortality. For household members 
over age 4, Susenas has information on current school attendance, the highest school level ever attended, 
and the highest grade ever attended.   School levels range from primary school to senior high school and 
above.  
The Susenas sample was selected to be representative for each of Indonesia￿s roughly 300 
districts.  The 36,000 enumeration areas surveyed are drawn from the nation￿s 176,582 enumeration areas 
(Surbakti, 1997: 23).  The Indonesian Bureau of Statistics mapped enumeration areas so that there is a 
clear boundary with between 200 and 300 households (Surbakti, 1997: 29). Although Indonesian cities 
are often more complexly laid out than are American cities, one can think of enumeration areas as similar 
to a US city block. 
Our bereaved sample (3,119 observations) includes respondents aged 6 through 20, who are 
children of the household head and spouse, and who live in households where either the head or spouse 
died within the year prior to the survey.
8   
Our control group (14,315 observations) consists of respondents aged 6 through 20, who live in 
households where their parent is the household head, and which is in the same neighborhood as a child 
who lost a parent. By comparing households in roughly the same block, our geographic controls capture 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 See Sullivan, 1994; Geertz, 1961: 26, 29 and 83; and Jellinek, 1991 for ethnographic descriptions of these 
institutions. 
8 Susenas links children with their biological mother if she lives in the same household, which allows us to exclude 
stepmother cases from the controls.  Susenas also gives each member’s relationship to the household head, who is 
usually male, but does not distinguish between children and stepchildren.  We are therefore unable to exclude many 12 
many dimensions of the household, such as exposure to contagious diseases or distance to a health clinic 
or school. Moreover, in Indonesia, as in the rest of the world, geographic segregation based on income, 
education, ethnicity, and other factors has important effects on investments in children. 
The Susenas dataset provides cross-sectional data on enrollments, yet we would like to be able to 
examine how changes in the number of surviving parents affect changes in enrollment.  To calculate the 
change in enrollment, we have selected a population that is near the age-appropriate grade level.  This 
population is likely to have been enrolled in the previous year.  For example, if a 15-year-old￿s 
educational attainment is the fourth grade, we do not consider her for the sample at risk for dropping out 
of high school last year.  Specifically, we have divided bereaved and control observations in overlapping 
4-year age groups, conditioned on the attainment of an age-adjusted education level, as Table 1 details.  
The age-appropriate school level for each 4-year age group was determined by a nation-wide analysis that 
shows approximately 95% of students currently enrolled in each grade level are in the designated four-
year age group (see Appendix 1).   
By selecting control children that are the same age, have the same education level, and are in the 
same neighborhood as bereaved children, we are comparing two groups that are similar with respect to 
many household characteristics.  As Table 2 shows, bereaved and control households have similar quality 
housing.  
Because bereaved households generally have older household heads and spouses, however, 
family composition varies slightly between bereaved and control households.  On average, bereaved 
families have 0.38 fewer children than control families (gap significant at the 5 percent level).  
Furthermore, household head and spouse education levels vary between the two household types.  This 
gap is, again, because bereaved heads and spouses are older than controls, and older Indonesians 
generally have had less education. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stepfather cases. Furthermore, because information linking children to their father is only available for children and 
stepchildren of the household head, other children are excluded from this study.   13 
Not surprisingly, consumption patterns vary between the household that did and did not suffer the 
loss of a parent the previous year. Bereaved and control households are not significantly different in the 
share, or per capita rupiah value spent monthly on food and non-food consumption (Table 3). They do 
vary, however, in the distribution of non-food spending. Bereaved households spend an average of  11.8% 
more of their total monthly expenditures on health and ceremony expenses than control households do.  
These higher expenditures are expected in families that lost an adult and hosted a funeral.  Both the 
bereaved and control households we have selected had total expenditures on average 4.6% less per month 




Our first set of analyses compares enrollment means of students in the bereaved and control samples, 
divided into 12 overlapping age groups.  The gap in enrollment between these two groups is due both to 
parental death and to any household characteristics that differ between families that live in the same 
neighborhood but are at high and low risk of parental death.  We use both parametric and nonparametric 
methods to control for any differences. 
Regression adjustments 
We control for variables that jointly determine enrollment and parental death by estimating a 
logistic regression for the probability of enrollment controlling for observable household characteristics 
with a fixed effect for each enumeration area.  This parametric approach allows us to control for 
community characteristics that are common to all households in the enumeration area as well as observed 
household characteristics that may be correlated with death and enrollment, such as parent’s age, 
household size, household construction, access to electricity and plumbing, and many others. 
To perform this analysis we took advantage of the fact that the Susenas data were collected by 
sampling approximately 16 households within an enumeration area, where an enumeration area is a 
contiguous set of houses corresponding to roughly a city block.  In the discussion below we refer to youth 14 
from the same enumeration area as being from the same neighborhood; given the rural setting for the 
majority of our sample, it would be equally accurate to refer to them as youth from the same village.  
By controlling for neighborhood fixed effects, this model accounts for all factors that are constant 
within an enumeration area.  These factors include neighborhood influences on children, common labor 
market, distance to a health clinic and school, and many other factors that influence all children in a 
village or neighborhood. 
We estimated the model using the conditional likelihood method suggested in Chamberlain 
(1980).  This method estimates a likelihood function that conditions out the incidental parameter (i.e. the 
neighborhood fixed effects).  Specifically, by conditioning on the sum of the probabilities that children in 
a neighborhood enroll in school, the resulting likelihood function is no longer a function of the 
neighborhood fixed effects. In this case, the probability that a child i from neighborhood j is enrolled in 
school is:  




















where   Eij = 1 if child i from neighborhood j is enrolled in school and 0 otherwise 
Ij = the number of children in neighborhood j 
Xij = x1ij￿xnkj = a vector household and individual characteristics that affect the enrollment of 
child i from in neighborhood j including whether a parent died last year. 
The conditional logit procedure only uses information from neighborhoods in which both bereaved and 
control observations are present and where their enrollment outcomes differed.  The neighborhoods in 
which no child had a parent die or in which all parents die add zero to the likelihood function.  We 
estimate effects separately for each grade. 
Propensity score matching within a neighborhood 
Our final set of results uses a propensity-score matching estimator.  Unlike fully parametric 
estimation techniques, this approach does not impose strong restrictions on functional forms.  These 15 
restrictions are an important limitation on conditional logits, because our sample of children varies widely 
in key characteristics, even after conditioning for age and education level.  The assumption of a logistic 
function requires a single estimated effect to be calculated from a data set of children who differ widely in 
individual characteristics, and these characteristics may have different effects depending on their values. 
The ideal experiment compares the outcome when two identical individuals are exposed to the 
same treatment.  The propensity score matching method is an approximation of this experiment.  Instead 
of comparing each treated individual to an exact untreated counterpart, the matching method finds the 
closest match within a highly comparable subsample of controls.   
Here, the "closest" individual is defined as the one living in the same neighborhood who is most 
similar to the bereaved observation in the set of characteristics that are significant in determining who 
loses a parent. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) stress the importance of the distribution of the 
probability coming from the same support.  To further test the strength of within-neighborhood matching, 
we compared these results to those obtained by matching within the entire sample. While both sets of 
results support the same conclusions, the full-sample matching results are less consistent (see Appendix 
3). 
  This propensity score is found by running conditional logits, similar to the ones described above, 
to estimate the probability of a parent dying in the previous year.   We matched each child who had a 
parent die in the previous year with a child from a two-parent family, who had the closest propensity 
score among neighbors who were in the same four-year age group and had completed the same level of 
education. Research using the matching method has shown that matching on the propensity score may be 
more powerful and accurate than standard regression techniques, particularly when controlling for region 
fixed effects (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  
 16 
Results 
Our first set of results simply compares average enrollment of bereaved children and their neighbors of 
the same age and sex by age and education group. These results show that the dropout rate for children 
who have recently lost a parent is significantly higher in almost all age groups than it is for their peers in 
two-parent households (Table 4). The results also suggest that older children￿s enrollment is more 
affected by a parent’s death. The only exception is if a student has just completed a school level.  For 
example, the difference in enrollment drops from 6.5 percent for students who have started, and in many 
cases finished, the last year of primary school (grade 6), to 5.4 percent for students who have begun the 
first year of junior high school (grade 7). The gap drops again from 9.7 percent for students who are in 
their last year of junior high school (grade 9), to 5.4 percent for those who have started senior high school.   
While the gap in enrollment increases as students advance within each school level, overall 
enrollment declines as children get older.  The relative dropout rate (% bereaved dropouts/%control 
dropouts), therefore, actually declines within each major school level and jumps at the start of new school 
level.  This result implies that bereaved students have a lower risk of being pulled out of school in 
response to a parent’s death as they are nearing completion of a school level.  The hazard increases at the 
beginning of a school level, possibly because the returns to a year of education are higher if by 
completing that year the student also completes a new school level.  Table 4 shows that the relative 
dropout rate falls in 5
th and 6
th grade, as primary school is ending, and jumps at the beginning of 7
th grade 
(junior high school).  Finally, the relative dropout rate is highest after starting first grade, possibly 
because it is easier for parents to restart their children in school, rather than withdrawing them and 
reenrolling them after they have completed several years of schooling. 
Enrollment comparisons using conditional logits control for household characteristics, such as 
wealth, which may be inversely correlated to parental death and independently have an impact on school 
enrollment.  Controlling for these factors reduces the impact of parental death on enrollment relative to 
the difference in means results, although the pattern of risk is similar (Table 5). Students who are 17 
completing a level of schooling (that is, primary school or junior high school) have a lower risk of 
dropping out relative to their peers, than students who have started the next level of schooling.  
Differences in enrollment for students eligible to be in grades 10 and above are insignificant in the 
conditional logit results. 
The results of Table 5 are also expressed as the Relative Dropout, which is in the last column.  
Bereaved families are over 4 times more likely to fail to enroll a child entering first grade than a similar 
child in a control (2-parent) family.  A child in the last grade of high school who loses a parent is 1.2 
times as likely to fail to enroll compared with a control child.  Averaging over all grades a bereaved child 
is 1.8 times as likely to stop school as a control child.  
The matching approach removes the functional form restrictions imposed by the conditional logit 
results.  Comparing bereaved children with controls with the closest propensity score, however, yields 
similar results to the parametric approach (Table 6): the hazard again decreases fairly consistently with 
age through sixth grade, increases after children start junior high, and declines again until senior high 
school.  Overall, a child whose parent died last year is 2.0 times more likely to drop out of school than a 
peer. 
When we compare the relative dropout rates calculated using the three approaches, we again see 
that the pattern of the effect is similar in all three cases, although the magnitude of the effect is generally 
smaller when household characteristics have been controlled for (see Figure 1). That the standard 
statistical analysis (conditional logit, Table 5) and matching estimates (Table 6) are similar in pattern and 
magnitude increases our confidence in these results. 
Imperfect capital markets  
  The results in Tables 4 through 6 reject the hypothesis, based on the assumption of perfect capital 
markets, that enrollment is unaffected by parental loss.  To further test the relationship between liquidity 
constraint and the effect of a parent￿s death, we ran our conditional logit model again, this time including 
an interaction with parent death and an index of advantage.  18 
  To create the index of advantage, we estimated consumption as a function of surviving parent 
education, average neighborhood consumption, family composition and household construction quality.  
The predicted value from this equation is a sensible measure of a family￿s permanent income.  In a 
situation where borrowing is often difficult, high estimated consumption also correlates with high current 
assets.  On average, we expect families with a high index of advantage (that is, predicted consumption) to 
be less likely to face liquidity constraints after a negative income shock. 
  As the results in Table 7 show, high-asset families do not experience a lower effect of parental 
death.  The interaction term is small and not statistically significant.  Thus, there is no evidence that 
children in households with pre-existing advantages suffer smaller enrollment declines after losing a 
parent. 
Sons vs. daughters 
Theories of intra-household allocation suggest that daughters, especially eldest daughters, will be 
particularly disadvantaged after the loss of a parent.  Moreover, if sons are favored, then losing a parent is 
more costly to children when they have many brothers than if they have many sisters.  
While it is not true that daughters are more likely to drop out than are sons, it is true that eldest 
daughters who have younger siblings are more likely to drop out than are sons.  This result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the eldest daughter steps in to perform childcare and housework after a parent 
dies. After seeing these results we realized they might hold largely after loss of a mother, as a daughter￿s 
labor may be a better substitute for her mother￿s work than for her father￿s.  In results not shown, the 
effect on oldest daughters was not statistically significantly larger if her mother died than if her father 
died.  
Finally, the proportion of siblings who are brothers has no effect on the increased rate of dropping 
out by children who lose a parent.  These results were similar when we added interactions separately for 
each grade level (results available on request).  19 
Loss of a mother vs. a father 
If fathers￿ higher average earnings play a larger role in children￿s education than do mothers￿ 
traditional larger role in child rearing and tying to social networks, then we would expect the loss of a 
father to have a larger effect on children￿s education than the loss of a mother.  In fact, when we ran a 
pooled conditional logit with age and education dummies, there is no statistically significant difference in 
the effect of maternal and paternal mortality (Table 8, Specification E).  When we re-ran the analysis 
interacting paternal loss with each grade, we found that paternal loss mattered slightly more for 
elementary school continuation than for higher grades (results available on request).  Finally, maternal 
and paternal loss did not appear to have a larger effect on own-sex children (Specification F).  
 
Potential Biases 
While the methodologies we used are designed to minimize bias, a number of unobserved characteristics 
remain that can bias the results, and gaps in the data may distort our results.  For several reasons most of 
these potential biases reduce the estimated magnitude of the effect of parental death on child enrollment.  
Thus, the true effect of losing a parent is probably larger than our estimates. 
  First, because Susenas only allows us to link household heads with their children, we are not able 
to capture the effect of a shock on children whose parents are not the head of the household in which they 
live. Therefore, children sent to live with relatives or other families after a parent’s death cannot be 
included in the bereaved group, and children who lose both parents in one year are by definition not the 
child of any household head. These children may be at greater risk of dropping out of school, and 
therefore omitting them reduces our estimates.   
  Second, Susenas only surveys children living in households.  This means that our data does not 
include street children or children living in institutions such as orphanages.  Children who have lost a 
parent are at above-average risk of leaving the Susenas sample for non-standard arrangements.  Thus, 20 
missing such children are probably more likely after a parent dies, and missing them will probably cause 
us to underestimate the reduction in child welfare following loss of a parent. 
  Third, a parent￿s death is sometimes preceded by a long illness.  If that illness reduced child 
enrollments prior to death, then the decline in enrollment after parental death we measure is lower than 
the decline in enrollment due to illness plus death.   
Working in the other direction, if the survey is taken during a transitory period after the death of a 
parent, we may over-estimate the gap in enrollment due to this shock.  A child and the family may be 
traumatized, be busy with the funeral, be preparing to move, or just have moved and not yet have re-
enrolled in school. 
We investigate the importance of two of these potential biases using longitudinal data from the 
Indonesia Family Life Surveys (IFLS). First, do we miss many children in the Susenas sample? Second, 
were families that would soon lose a parent already severely disadvantaged prior to parental death?  The 
IFLS is a panel survey of over 7,000 households representative of 83% of the population conducted in 
1994 and in 1998.   
Do most children who lose a parent live with a surviving parent?  
Among 5,488 children ages 6 to 15 in the 1997 IFLS, 140 children lost 91 parents between 1993 
and 1997.  Of this sample, none lost both parents the same year.  Although some Indonesian children do 
lose both parents within a year, the rarity of this event is reassuring because it implies we are not missing 
too many children who lost both parents when we examine the Susenas, with its one-year recall. 
In 4 percent of the cases, a bereaved child who lost a parent between 1993 and 1997 moved to a 
new household without his or her remaining parent by 1997.  When such moves happened in the year 
after losing a parent, the Susenas dataset would not identify that child as having lost a parent.  In addition, 
in another 1.4 percent of the cases, both the parent and child left their 1993 household, and we could not 
determine if they were living together in 1997.  Presumably if the Susenas included information on 
bereaved children those who were fostered out (or living in orphanages and other institutions), 21 
enrollments would decline more than we measure.  Fortunately, such occurrences appear to be rare in 
Indonesia, so our results are probably fairly accurate. 
Do serious health problems usually predate death? 
It is possible that most parental deaths are preceded by long periods of ill health. Such ill health 
can both reduce ability to pay and increase the value of a child￿s work at home caring for siblings of the 
ailing adult.   Thus, we were also concerned that enrollment might be depressed in families that were soon 
to lose a parent prior to the parental death.  If this effect were strong, our estimates of the effects of 
parental death on school enrollments might seriously under-estimate the true effects of ill health and death 
combined.  
To test for the importance of this factor, we examined the health in 1993 of parents who died 
between 1993 and 1997.  Our measure of health is an index of an individual￿s self-reported ability to 
physically perform activities of daily living (ADLs): to carry a heavy load for 20 meters; sweep the floor 
or yard; walk for 5 kilometers; take water from a well; and bend, kneel, or stoop. These self-reported 
physical functioning measures have shown high reliability and validity in both the United States and East 
Asian countries (Andrews et al., 1986; Guralnik et al., 1989; Ju and Jones, 1989; Strauss et al., 1993; 
Ware, Davies-Avery, and Brook, 1980). 
Parents who would die by 1997 already had slightly worse health in 1993 than those that would 
live to 1997, but the differences are small and not significant.  For example, of 5 activities of daily living 
such as walking 2 kilometers, 89.9 percent of parents who would live and 82.9 percent of those who 
would soon die could perform all of them easily.  
Parents who would soon die are a few years older on average than other parents.  Moreover, age 
strongly correlates with worse health in Indonesia.  Thus, it is important to control for this and other 
factors when examining if parents who would soon die were particularly disadvantaged prior to their 
death.  In fact, when we control for Island group, urban, village population, and household composition, 22 
none of the health differences are statistically significantly different between parents who would soon die 
and those that would live past 1997
9.  
In short, deaths of parents of school-aged Indonesian children appear to largely be surprises.  
Results in nations with high rates of HIV/AIDS or the elderly (where cancers and general frailty are more 
prevalent) might be very different.  
  
Conclusions 
The basic result of this paper is that a recent parent’s death reduces children’s enrollment in Indonesia.  
This effect is highest for youth at the transitions between primary and junior secondary and between 
junior secondary and secondary.  Our results are more convincing than past findings for two reasons.  
First, we use both parametric and semi-nonparametric methods. Second, we have a much larger sample 
size than most prior research on this topic 
  Our findings have important implications for children of bereaved families in developing 
countries.  In 1999, about 2.2 million Indonesian children under the age of fifteen were living with a 
widowed parent.
10  Our results indicate that children in such families leave school at roughly 50 percent 
higher rates than do their classmates.  Given the high returns to education in Indonesia, even at primary 
levels, and the high percentage of families living at or below the poverty level, this loss in schooling 
could substantially reduce the future living standard of these children.   
It is possible that some of the lower enrollment we observe is due to family￿s efficiently reducing 
expenditures on education that is largely for consumption and efficiently reallocating time use as the 
marginal costs and benefits of schooling shift.  At the same time, if the reduction in family income 
coupled with liquidity constraints drives the lower enrollment of bereaved children, the government may 
have a role in providing socially funded life insurance and in promoting the growth of formal and 
informal insurance mechanisms.  Moreover, when targeting scholarships or other assistance to children, 
                                                           
9 The results of this analysis are available on request. 23 
having lost a parent may be a good signal of deprivation and the potential for high returns.  Donors to 
poor nations may want to target assistance at children who have lost a parent, particularly orphans.   
The HIV/AIDS crisis is leading to rising death rates for parents of children in many nations, and the 
policy response to supporting bereaved school-aged children will be increasingly important for policy-
makers in many nations.  
While our research shows a substantial short-term impact of a parent’s death on enrollment, 
additional work is needed to identify the long-term effects.  For example, a parent’s death may lead to a 
child’s temporary exit from school due to a change in residence or short-term work requirements until the 
household’s income stream is stabilized.  Depending on the length of time away from school and the 
probability of reenrollment, the long-term effect on a child’s schooling could vary dramatically.  While 
determining the magnitude of this effect is not within the scope of this study, it is an important issue for 
future research. 
Additionally, improved data would be useful to better capture the direct effect of parental loss on 
enrollment.  Because our data set is not a true panel, it does not include information on children’s 
enrollment status prior to their parent’s death.  While we used several methods to infer the enrollment 
status of children before their parent’s death, the variation in the age at which children start school in 
Indonesia makes it impossible to be fully confident in our assumptions.   
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Table 1: Educational Conditioning of Bereaved and Control Groups 
 
Normative       Sample Observations 
Grade  Age Group  Conditioned On:  Bereaved Control Total
1  6-9  Started first grade  745 3,495 4,240
2 7-10  Started  second  grade  788 3,568 4,356
3 8-11  Started  third  grade  750 3,059 3,809
4  9-12  Started fourth grade  809 3,225 4,034
5 10-13  Started  fifth  grade  771 2,927 3,698
6 11-14  Started  sixth  grade  783 2,686 3,469
7  12-15  Started seventh grade  548 1,820 2,368
8 13-16  Started  eighth  grade  513 1,617 2,130
9  14-17  Started ninth grade  437 1,307 1,744
10 15-18  Started  tenth  grade  307 760 1,067
11 16-19  Started  eleventh  grade  292 699 991
12  17-20  Started twelfth grade  225 524 749
           
Notes: Bereaved households lost a parent in the previous year.  Controls are two-parent 
households in the same neighborhood, with a child of the same age and schooling level as a 
bereaved household. The total number of distinct observations (3,119 bereaved children and 
14,315 control) is less than the sum of the columns above because some observations are listed in 
more than one age group. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Bereaved, Control and All Households 
 
   
Bereaved 
Households   
Control 
Households    Difference  
All           
Households 
                     




Mean Pr>|t| Mean Standard 
error
Floor size (m
2)  71.78 2.442 68.88 1.151  2.896 0.171 65.17 0.083
Wall quality high  0.793 0.013 0.824 0.009 -0.032 0.013 0.776 0.001
Roof quality high  0.532 0.016 0.537 0.016 -0.004 0.698 0.545 0.001
Floor quality high  0.591 0.015 0.616 0.012 -0.025 0.049 0.572 0.001
Electricity    0.652 0.014 0.672 0.013 -0.020 0.082 0.667 0.001
Private water source  0.524 0.015 0.539 0.013 -0.014 0.280 0.480 0.001
Easy-access water source  0.452 0.015 0.471 0.014 -0.019 0.172 0.453 0.001
Toilet    0.342 0.015 0.359 0.014 -0.016 0.185 0.349 0.001
                      




Mean Pr>|t| Mean Standard 
error
Household size  4.688 0.056 5.662 0.031 -0.974 0.000 4.285 0.003
# children of household head*  2.787 0.045 3.171 0.027 -0.384 0.000 2.822 0.004
# daughters of household head*  1.366 0.035 1.519 0.017 -0.231 0.000 1.347 0.003
# sons of household head*  1.421 0.034 1.652 0.018 -0.153 0.000 1.475 0.003
                     




Mean Pr>|t| Mean Standard 
error
Primary head is female  0.676 0.014 0.001 0.000  0.675 0.000 0.127 0.001
Age of female head or spouse (FH)  41.86 0.238 37.59 0.116  4.261 0.000 43.57 0.023
Age of male head or spouse (MH)  48.45 0.291 43.07 0.134  5.383 0.000 39.79 0.022
School years, FH 20-39  5.190 0.160 5.877 0.103  0.686 0.000 6.270 0.008
School years, FH 40-59  4.618 0.138 5.554 0.119  0.937 0.000 4.200 0.011
School years, FH 60+  3.681 0.887 3.847 0.946  0.166 0.898 1.783 0.015
School years, MH 20-39  6.032 0.214 6.746 0.108  0.714 0.001 7.401 0.010
School years, MH 40-59  6.342 0.144 6.984 0.126  0.642 0.000 6.185 0.011
School years, MH 60+  4.864 0.263 4.930 0.285  0.066 0.858 3.580 0.016
                      
Number of observations (HHs)   1,700    9,133       612,418 
                     
*Includes only households where  household ( hh)  head has children             
Notes:  The female head (FH) is the household head in cases where the reported head is female, and the spouse of the 
household head if the reported head is male.  The reverse holds for data on the male head (MH).Appendix 2 provides variable 
definitions. 
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Households   
Control 
Households    Difference   
All           
Households 
                        





Mean Pr>|t|  Mean Standard 
error
Food    28,055 665 28,292 808  -237 0.646  30,804 36.0
                       
Alcohol & tobacco  1,925 105 2,986 69  -1,061 0.000  3,368 8.0
Alcohol & tobacco, adult pc  3,536 206 5,825 129  -2,289 0.000  5,139 11.1
                       
Health and ceremonies  8,736 1,630 3,140 218  5,596 0.001  3,623 60.5
Other non-food  19,720 1,159 22,591 2,092 -2,871 0.060  22,226 107.7
All non-food  30,381 2,147 28,717 2,198  1,664 0.464  29,217 126.9
                       
Total    58,436 2,529 57,009 2,933  1,427 0.578  60,020 144.0
                       
Household Consumption Shares                   
Food    0.586 0.005 0.588 0.004  -0.003 0.499  0.595 0.000
                       
Tobacco and alchohol  0.040 0.002 0.066 0.001  -0.025 0.000  0.065 0.000
Health and ceremonies  0.301 0.017 0.183 0.006  0.118 0.000  0.179 0.001
Other non-food  0.073 0.015 0.163 0.006  -0.090 0.000  0.161 0.001
All non-food  0.414 0.005 0.412 0.004  0.003 0.499  0.405 0.000
                        
Number of observations (HHs)  1,700   9,133         612,385 
                        
Notes: Household food consumption data is given for the week prior to the survey date, and non-food consumption is given 
for the prior year.  Both sets of data were first converted to monthly consumption and then adjusted for household members 
who died in the last year, by adding 1/24
th to the household size in per capita calculations.  Pr>|t| presents the p-value of 
the t-test that the difference in means between the control and bereaved households is statistically significant. 
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Table 4:  Difference in Enrollment Rates Between Bereaved and Control Age-Groups 
 




error   Mean
Standard 
error   Mean Pr>|t|
Relative 
Dropout
                  
1 0.977 0.008  0.996 0.001  -0.019 0.017 5.51
2 0.968 0.009  0.991 0.002  -0.023 0.011 3.45
3 0.963 0.009  0.983 0.003  -0.020 0.043 2.17
4 0.941 0.011  0.975 0.004  -0.034 0.002 2.39
5 0.882 0.016  0.935 0.008  -0.053 0.000 1.81
6 0.815 0.017  0.880 0.012  -0.065 0.000 1.54
7 0.917 0.018  0.971 0.005  -0.054 0.004 2.88
8 0.851 0.021  0.937 0.009  -0.086 0.000 2.38
9 0.808 0.024  0.904 0.013  -0.097 0.000 2.01
10 0.886 0.025  0.939 0.011  -0.054 0.025 1.89
11 0.821 0.027  0.860 0.016  -0.039 0.178 1.28
12 0.569 0.046  0.643 0.029  -0.073 0.130 1.21
                  
Notes: Both control and bereaved children were within the normal range for completed schooling given 
their age.  Control children live in the same enumeration area and are the same age and sex as a bereaved 
child.  Pr>|t| presents the probability that a two-tailed t-test cannot reject the hypothesis that mean 
enrollment rates of bereaved and control children are equal.  Relative dropout rate = (bereaved dropout 
rate)/(control dropout rate).  See Table 1 for number of observations in each group. 
  28 
 Table 5: The Effect of a Parent’s Death on Enrollment: Conditional Logit Estimates 
Dependent variable = enrollment 
 
 
  Retained Obervations   
Parent Died 
Coefficient    
Normative 
Grade Bereaved Control Total  dP/dx P>|z| 
Relative 
Dropout
1 30 136  166  -0.024 0.007  4.17
2 56 267  323  -0.018 0.002  2.34
3 72 345  417  -0.023 0.004  2.11
4 113 487  600  -0.023 0.007  1.73
5 177 653  830  -0.026 0.077  1.35
6 265 848  1113  -0.042 0.034  1.31
7 81 274  355  -0.038 0.001  1.91
8 129 385  514  -0.066 0.001  1.78
9 149 424  573  -0.074 0.001  1.62
10 69 154  223  0.014 0.617  0.82
11 121 299  420  -0.038 0.254  1.25
12 133 296  429  -0.069 0.237  1.18
               
Notes:  Additional control variables are listed in Appendix 2. Relative dropout rate = 
(bereaved dropout rate)/(control dropout rate) . Sample sizes are smaller than in other 
analyses because only enumeration areas with bereaved and control children whose 
dropout status differed are retained in the conditional logit analysis. 
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Table 6: The Effect of a Parent’s Death on Enrollment: Matching Technique Estimates 
 
 
   




















1   727  14 4 0 745 0.994 0.977 -0.017 0.041  0.286 3.93
2   752  21 13 2 788 0.986 0.968 -0.018 0.055  0.619 2.27
3   707  26 16 1 750 0.981 0.963 -0.018 0.086  0.615 1.94
4   748  41 17 3 809 0.973 0.941 -0.032 0.019  0.415 2.16
5   656  69 31 15 771 0.935 0.882 -0.053 0.005  0.449 1.81
6   591  94 55 43 783 0.861 0.815 -0.045 0.051  0.585 1.33
7   499  34 12 3 548 0.964 0.917 -0.047 0.028  0.353 2.30
8   426  51 26 10 513 0.925 0.851 -0.073 0.006  0.510 1.97
9   321  66 35 15 437 0.881 0.808 -0.073 0.019  0.530 1.61
10   254  24 20 9 307  0.931 0.886 -0.045 0.104  0.833 1.65
11   196  45 34 17 292  0.883 0.821 -0.062 0.075  0.756 1.53
12   82  51 39 53 225  0.570 0.569 0.000 0.995  0.765 1.00
                         
                          
Notes: The total number of distinct observations included above is 6756 (2879 bereaved children and 3877 controls).  This 
number is smaller than the sum of the control and bereaved observations above (13936 = 6968 x 2) because certain 
observations appear in more than one overlapping age group, and a control can be matched to more than one bereaved child. 
Relative dropout = (bereaved dropout rate) /(control dropout rate).  Diff = percent of bereaved enrolled - percent of control 
enrolled.  Pr>|t| presents the probability that a two-tailed t-test cannot reject the hypothesis that mean enrollment rates of 
bereaved and control children are equal. 
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Table 7: The Effect of the Interaction Between High Assets and Parental Loss on Enrollment: 
Conditional Logit Estimates 
Dependent variable = enrollment 
 
 
Number of obs  8,575      
LR chi2(42)  1,694      
Prob > chi2  0      
Log likelihood  -1,599       
            
            
Independent Variables  Coef Std Err P>|z|  
Parent died   -1.081 0.241 0.000  
Advantage index  4.387 0.627 0.000  
Parent died * advantage index  0.345 0.276 0.212    
# Siblings  0.017 0.051 0.745    
Son   -0.008 0.137 0.952  
Oldest son   -0.224 0.125 0.072  
Oldest daughter   -0.359 0.124 0.004  
     
     
Notes: Additional control variables include number of siblings, mothers’ and fathers￿ ages, 
house characteristics, whether the child was the oldest son or oldest daughter, child 
age/education group dummies and these dummies interacted with parent died dummy.The 
index of advantage is predicted consumption based on a regression controlling for the 
surviving parent￿s education, average neighborhood consumption, family composition and 
household construction quality.   
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Table 8: Intrahousehold Results: Conditional Logit Estimates 
Dependent variable = enrollment 
 
 
Specification: A B C D E F  
   
Independent Variable  dP/dx dP/dx dP/dx dP/dx dP/dx dP/dx  Mean
Parent died (prtd)  -0.001 -0.005 -0.020 -0.025 -0.022 -0.024 0.179
  0.987 0.927 0.743 0.678 0.713 0.696  0.383
              
Daughter  -0.007 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.485
  0.323 0.122 0.096 0.129 0.126 0.129  0.500
              
Daughter*Parent died  0.002 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.035 0.087
  0.906 0.105 0.098 0.096 0.092 0.063  0.282
              
Oldest  -0.027 -0.029 -0.032 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 0.375
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.484
              
Oldest daughter  0.013 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.226
    0.213 0.157 0.237 0.234 0.237  0.419
              
Oldest daughter*Parent died  -0.050 -0.053 -0.057 -0.058 -0.058 0.035
    0.010 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.183
              
Siblings     -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009  3.516
     0.023 0.017 0.016 0.016  1.521
              
Siblings*Parent died   0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.601
     0.286 0.444 0.438 0.436  1.442
              
Brothers       0.007 0.007 0.007  0.483
       0.452 0.451 0.450  0.363
              
Brothers* Parent died     0.022 0.022 0.022  0.083
       0.259 0.265 0.263  0.238
              
Mother died      -0.008 0.001  0.058
         -0.580 0.943  0.233
              
Daughter*Mother died       -0.020  0.029
         0.428  0.168
              
              
Notes:  Other controls include mother and fathers￿ ages, house characteristics, child age/education 
group dummies and these dummies interacted with parent died dummy.  Italicized numbers beneath 
coefficients are p-statistics; italicized numbers beneath means are standard deviations.  
Specification F was also run with Oldest daughter * mother died replacing Oldest daughter * 
parent died.  The coefficient in this case was not significant. Number of observations = 17,434. 32 
Figure 1: Relative Dropout Rates 
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Appendix 2: Control Variables Used in Conditional Logit Regressions 
 
No. of siblings, self included 
1 if male 
1 if oldest son 





Wall quality high = 1 if walls made from strong material (brick or wood ). 
Roof quality high = 1 if roof made from strong material (concrete, wood or tile) 
Floor quality high = 1 if floors made from strong material (marble, ceramic or brick) 
Electricity = 1 if household has access to electricity 
Private water source = 1 if private water source 
Easy access water source = 1 if household has protected and nearby water source 
Toilet = 1 if household has a toilet 
Grade:  Primary School  Junior High  Senior High 
  1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A g e                    
5 2% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
6  26% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
7  51% 18%  1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
8  14% 47% 15% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
9  3% 24% 44% 14% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10 1% 6% 29% 45% 15% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
11 1% 1%  7% 26% 41% 14% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
12 1% 1%  3% 9% 30% 47% 18% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
13 0% 0%  1% 3% 9% 27% 45% 18% 2% 0% 0% 0%
14 0% 0%  0% 1% 3% 8% 25% 44% 18% 2% 0% 0%
15 0% 0%  0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 25% 46% 19% 2% 0%
16 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 24% 49% 23% 3%
17 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 7% 22% 47% 23%
18 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 6% 20% 42%
19 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 5% 21%
20 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 7%
21 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
22 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
                  
Total 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%100% 100% 100% 100%
                  
Bold percentages are students are considered age-appropriate for that grade: 
S u m                      
in bold  94% 95% 94% 95% 95% 95% 96% 95% 95% 95% 95% 94%34 
Appendix 3: Comparison of Matching Within the Entire Sample and Within Enumeration 
Area  
 
Table A3.1: Matching Technique Estimates: Best Match within Sample 
 
 
   
Who is Enrolled in Each Pair?  Percent of Children Enrolled    Dropout 
Statistics 
Normative 















1   731 14 0 0 745 1.000 0.977 -0.023 0.00  0.000 ---
2   758 23 7 0 788 0.994 0.968 -0.026 0.00  0.304 5.28
3   720 27 3 0 750 0.995 0.963 -0.032 0.00  0.111 7.91
4   731 42 34 2 809 0.960 0.941 -0.019 0.14  0.810 1.49
5   635 76 52 8 771 0.929 0.882 -0.047 0.01  0.684 1.67
6   557 118 89 19 783 0.867 0.815 -0.052 0.02  0.754 1.39
7   489 37 22 0 548 0.971 0.917 -0.055 0.01  0.595 2.91
8   407 53 45 8 513 0.912 0.851 -0.060 0.03  0.849 1.68
9   314 61 42 20 437 0.893 0.808 -0.085 0.00  0.689 1.80
10   236 28 38 5 307 0.927 0.886 -0.042 0.12 1.357 1.57
11   186 52 44 10 292 0.855 0.821 -0.033 0.36 0.846 1.23
12   61 62 60 42 225 0.527 0.569 0.042 0.51 0.968 0.91
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Table A3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Matched Households: Best Match in Enumeration Area versus Best 
Match in Sample 
 
 
   Best Match in EA  
Best Match in 
Sample    Difference 





Household Characteristics                
Floor size (m
2)   70.969 0.597 76.070 0.798  -5.101 0.000
Wall quality high  0.840 0.004 0.811 0.005  0.029  0.000
Roof quality high  0.464 0.006 0.458 0.006  0.007  0.424
Floor quality high  0.590 0.006 0.595 0.006 -0.005  0.558
Electricity    0.665 0.006 0.669 0.006 -0.003  0.666
Private water source  0.541 0.006 0.528 0.006  0.013  0.110
Easy-access water source  0.490 0.006 0.513 0.006 -0.024  0.005
Toilet    0.393 0.006 0.424 0.006 -0.031  0.000
                 
Household Composition                
Household size  5.710 0.019 5.381 0.019  0.329  0.000
# children of household head*  3.335 0.018 3.096 0.017  0.239  0.000
# daughters of household head*  1.590 0.014 1.526 0.013  0.174  0.000
# sons of household head*  1.745 0.014 1.570 0.014  0.064  0.001
                 
Household head and spouse                
Primary head is female  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000  0.414
Age of female head or spouse (FH)  40.174 0.079 42.547 0.090  -2.373 0.000
Age of male head or spouse (MH)  45.746 0.093 48.887 0.106  -3.142 0.000
School years, FH 20-39  5.876 0.060 6.645 0.082  0.768  0.000
School years, FH 40-59  5.706 0.066 5.112 0.057 -0.594  0.000
School years, FH 60+  4.050 0.723 3.887 0.472 -0.163  0.850
School years, MH 20-39  6.837 0.093 7.168 0.126  0.331  0.035
School years, MH 40-59  7.142 0.058 7.182 0.061  0.040  0.631
School years, MH 60+  5.264 0.180 4.426 0.118 -0.838  0.000
                 
Number of observations (HHs)  6,968   6,968       36 
Table A3.3 Consumption of Matched Households: Best Match in Enumeration Area versus Best Match in 
Sample 
 
   Best Match in EA  
Best Match in 







Per Capita Consumption                
Food    28,715 760 30,570 1,174  -1,855  0.102
                  
Alcohol & tobacco  2,769 82 3,117 240  -349 0.152
Alcohol & tobacco, adult pc  5,303 158 5,500 298  -197  0.51
                  
Health and ceremonies  3,548 310 3,238 288  310 0.326
Other non-food  23,468 1,506 26,049 2,006  -2,580  0.169
All non-food    29,785 1,609 32,404 2,154  -2,619  0.196
                  
Total    58,500 2,196 62,974 3,081  -4,474  0.126
                  
Household Consumption Shares                
Food    0.574 0.005 0.558 0.008  0.016 0.038
                  
Tobacco and alchohol  0.059 0.002 0.059 0.002  0.000 0.962
Health and ceremonies  0.199 0.010 0.191 0.013  0.007 0.534
Other non-food  0.167 0.010 0.191 0.015  -0.024 0.085
All non-food    0.426 0.005 0.442 0.008  -0.016 0.038
                  
Number of observations (HHs)  6,968   6,968      37 
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